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Executive summary
Ever since the eruption of the second Congo war in August 1998, the mining sector in eastern DRC
has been under scrutiny of UN Sanctions Committees, academics, NGOs, and local and international
media, who have been worried and disturbed by the links between natural resource exploitation and
armed conflict in the region. It has been argued that both state and non-state armed actors are deriving
benefit from the local mining business by levying taxes on mineral exports, by selling minerals for
their own profit, and by trading mining rights for financial and military support.
The present report aims to clarify the position of Belgian mineral traders in the area. The purpose of
the report is not only to shed more light on the activities of Trademet and Traxys, the two companies
featuring in the latest UN report (cfr. supra), but also to discuss the activities of two other companies
that have received no attention so far, namely Services and Trading International (STI) and Société
pour le Développement et l'Expansion d'Entreprises.
In the first part of our report, we offer a description of the context in which the mineral trade takes
place. We discuss the current state of affairs in the global trade in tin and tantalum, present an outline
of the mineral trade in the Kivu region and give a brief description of the local security situation. In
the second part of our report, we concentrate on the involvement of Belgian traders in the mineral
business of eastern DRC. Our main intention is to provide the reader with a profile of each of these
traders. As far as possible, we also present some information on the Congolese suppliers of the
Belgian traders.
Our research findings show that it is incorrect to suggest that the aforementioned Belgian traders
belong to a small group of foreign companies that are unscrupulously buying minerals from mines
controlled by armed groups in eastern DRC. The Belgian traders agree that it is high time to put a stop
to the chaos in the Congolese mining business and they are already putting pressure on their
Congolese partners not to buy minerals from conflict areas. While they realize that their own systems
of due diligence can still be improved, they ask the Congolese authorities and the international
community to take the necessary steps to regularize and render more transparent the activities taking
place at the lowest level of the commodity chain, that is, between the mining areas and the selling
points in the cities of Goma and Bukavu.
Given the large number of human rights abuses in the vicinity of certain mines and the fact that
members of both state and non-state armed groups continue to illicitly enrich themselves through the
mineral business, there is a need for a solid certification and mineral traceability system as well as for
a regularly updated database about militarized mining sites to make sure that 'clean' minerals can be
separated from 'dirty' minerals in an objective manner. In the absence of such measures, it is very hard
to tell whether and to what extent Congolese comptoirs and international traders have been playing a
negative role in the conflict in eastern DRC
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51. Introduction
Ever since the eruption of the second Congo war in August 1998, the mining sector in eastern DRC has been under 
scrutiny of UN Sanctions Committees, academics, NGOs, and local and international media, who are worried and dis-
turbed by the links between natural resource exploitation and armed conflict in the region. It is argued that both state 
and non-state armed actors are deriving benefit from the local mining business by levying taxes on mineral exports, by 
selling minerals for their own profit, and by trading mining rights for financial and military support1.  
In a recent UN report, serious allegations are made against Belgian companies involved in the trading of cassiterite 
and coltan. First, it is asserted that, for several years, the Belgian company Trademet worked with and pre-financed 
Munsad, a Goma-based comptoir run by Damien Munyarugerero, who is said to be close to Laurent Nkunda’s CNDP2. 
Second, it is contended that, in 2007, the Belgian company Traxys was one of the two only importers of cassiterite and 
coltan from Olive, Muyeye, WMC and MDM, 4 Bukavu-based comptoirs suspected of pre-financing négociants (=mid-
dlemen) who are working closely together with the FDLR3. 
The UN Panel of Experts recommends that, on the one hand, member states work together with local and international 
NGOs to draw a map of mineral-rich zones and armed groups in eastern DRC in order to do away with the uncertainty 
about the connection between the mineral trade and the war economy, while, on the other hand, it also urges member 
states to take appropriate measures to ensure that exporters and consumers of Congolese mineral products under 
their jurisdiction conduct due diligence on their suppliers4. 
As an NGO specialized in research on the exploitation of natu-
ral resources and the financing of conflicts in Central Africa, 
IPIS wants to support the efforts of the UN to make the min-
eral business in eastern DRC more transparent. Two of our 
researchers, who are specialized in the use of maps to analyze 
and discuss war motives in conflict areas, are currently in the 
Kivu region to collect new data on militarised mining. In addi-
tion to this, the present report aims to help the UN to get a 
better idea of the position of Belgian mineral traders in the 
area. The purpose of the report is not only to shed more light 
on the activities of Trademet and Traxys, the two companies 
featuring in the latest UN report (cfr. supra), but also to clarify 
the role of two other companies that have received no atten-
tion so far, namely Services and Trading International (STI) and 
Société pour le Développement et l’Expansion d’Entreprises. 
The extensive field experience in the region of our team, 
and our local network of contacts and informants allowed 
us to gather a considerable amount of information during a 
relatively short visit to Goma in October 2008. In the field, we 
mainly conducted interviews with business actors and officials 
from various relevant governmental agencies. Because of the 
sensitivity of the issue and a considerable deal of negative 
press in the past, commercial stakeholders generally met us 
with caution. Repeated contacts, however, in many cases cre-
ated a more ‘comfortable’ environment in which the exchange 
of information became smoother. Government agents in DRC 
in general showed an immediate willingness to contribute to 
our research, providing us, among other things, with statistics 
of the minerals trade in Goma and Bukavu. This left us with 
the hopeful impression that there is a fair amount of good will 
locally to sanitize the mining sector. It should be noted that we 
1 Between 2001 and 2003, a UN Panel of Experts published several reports on the Congolese war economy  (see: Interim Report, 16 January 2001 
(S/2001/49); Report,12 April 2001 (S/2001/357); Addendum Report, 13 November 2001 (S/2001/1072); Interim Report, 22 May 2002 (S/2002/565); 
Report, 16 October 2002 (S/2002/1146); Addendum, 20 June 2003 (S/2002/1146/Add. I); Report, 23 October 2003 (S/2003/1027). Among the aca-
demics who have been studying the war economy in eastern DRC one finds Koen Vlassenroot, Timothy Raeymaekers, Michael Nest, Stephen Jack-
son, Luca Jourdan and Sara Geenen. NGOs specialized in research on this issue include Global Witness, Southern Africa Resource Watch, Pole Insti-
tute and International Peace Information Service (IPIS). Finally, media coverage of the problem has been provided by the BBC, Channel Four, The 
Guardian, Mail & Guardian, Le Potentiel etcò.
2 S/2008/773: § 59-60. Annex 11 of the report shows an export certificate according to which, in June 2008, a charge of coltan with a gross weight of 
4.132 kg and an estimated total value of 34.000 USD was sent by Munsad to Trademet. 
3 S/2008/773: §78; §88. 
4 S/2008/773: recommendation 13, page 56
Barrels filled with minerals carrying the addresses of interna-
tional mineral traders  (IPIS 2008)
6made an effort to supplement the information gathered during our fieldwork with data collected from the Belgian 
National Bank, the Belgian State Monitor and the Luxemburg trade register (register de commerce et des sociétés). 
In the first part of our report, we offer a description of the context in which the mineral trade takes place. We discuss 
the current state of affairs in the global trade in tin and tantalum, present an outline of the mineral trade in the Kivu 
region and give a brief description of the local security situation. In the second part of our report, we concentrate on 
the involvement of Belgian traders in the mineral business of eastern DRC. Our main intention is to provide the reader 
with a profile of each of these traders. As far as possible, we also present some information on the Congolese suppliers 
of the Belgian traders.
Our research findings show that it is incorrect to suggest that the aforementioned Belgian traders belong to a small 
group of foreign companies that are unscrupulously buying minerals from mines controlled by armed groups in east-
ern DRC. The Belgian traders agree that it is high time to put a stop to the chaos in the Congolese mining business and 
they are already putting pressure on their Congolese partners not to buy minerals from conflict areas. While they real-
ize that their own systems of due diligence can still be improved, they ask the Congolese authorities and the interna-
tional community to take the necessary steps to regularize and render more transparent the activities taking place at 
the lowest level of the commodity chain, that is, between the mining areas and the selling points in the cities of Goma 
and Bukavu.
The publication of this IPIS report coincides with the decision of Traxys to stop the purchase of minerals originating 
from North Kivu, South Kivu and Maniema. In a letter addressed to the UN Panel of Experts, dated 24 April 2009, the 
company’s management explained that the discontinuance of Traxys’ activities in eastern DRC was due to three fac-
tors: Traxys’ inability to convince the Panel of Experts that it did not buy minerals from areas occupied by illegal armed 
groups, the suggestion of the UN Panel of Experts that stopping the acquisition of minerals coming from those areas 
was the only acceptable solution to the problem, and, finally, the company’s repeated but unsuccessful attempts to 
collaborate with the UN Panel of Experts in working out a protocol for the purchase of raw materials from eastern DRC 
that would be satisfactory to the United Nations. Although the authors of the letter regretted that their position in the 
local mineral market would probably be taken by ‘entities or individuals of smaller size who are unlikely to share the prin-
ciples of the international community in terms of ethics or the quality of counterpart diligence that Traxys has demonstrated 
in the past’, they nevertheless emphasized Traxys’ continued willingness to contribute to the development of a system 
of source verification on Congolese territory5.
Traxys’ decision to stop its activities in eastern DRC gives food for thought. First, there can be no doubt that the news 
about Traxys’ departure will be a great blow to the Congolese buying houses that have been collaborating with the 
company, sometimes even for a period of several years. These comptoirs will have to look for new partnerships with 
other international trading companies, a search that is likely to be rather troublesome given the continued insecurity 
in the Kivus and the unfavourable international market conditions at the moment. Second, one can wonder whether 
Traxys’ announcement will not have a domino effect, in other words, whether it will not push other traders to take 
the same decision, for fear that they might incur image damage if they decide to remain active in a known war zone 
while the majority of their competitors have already left. Should such a ‘domino scenario’ materialize, there is a great 
likelihood that many Congolese comptoirs will be forced to shut down their operations, which, in turn, will have a 
paralysing effect on artisanal mining activities throughout the region. Although very little is known about the profiles, 
backgrounds and motives of artisanal miners in eastern DRC, it cannot be excluded that a considerable number of 
them might consider joining an armed group as soon as they have troubles selling their minerals at a decent price or 
selling them at all.
Having said this, IPIS hopes that Traxys’ announcement will serve as a wake-up call to all the stakeholders in the mineral 
business in eastern DRC. Finding a long-term and structural solution to the problem of natural resource exploitation 
in the war-torn Kivu region is urgent and should no longer be delayed if the international community is serious about 
allowing the Congolese to use their minerals as a source for development6 and to establish a stronger connection with 
the global economy than is hitherto the case. Given the large number of human rights abuses in the vicinity of certain 
mines and the fact that members of both state and non-state armed groups continue to illicitly enrich themselves 
through the mineral business, there is a need for a solid certification and mineral traceability system as well as for a 
regularly updated database about militarized mining sites to make sure that ‘clean’ minerals can be separated from 
‘dirty’ minerals in an objective manner. In the absence of such measures, it is very hard to tell whether and to what 
extent Congolese comptoirs and international traders have been playing a negative role in the conflict in eastern DRC. 
While, on the one hand, we strongly believe in the use of ‘naming and shaming’ and holding companies accountable 
for how they organize their businesses, even if they are operating in an unstable environment such as the DRC, on the 
other hand, we think it is of vital importance to avoid oversimplified and stigmatizing evaluations of the activities of 
comptoirs and international companies, because such unfair assessments create the risk of chasing important discus-
sion partners away from the negotiation table. 
5 Letter from Traxys to the UN Panel of Experts, 24 April 2009. 
6 A similar argument is made in another recent report about the mineral business in eastern DRC. See: ‘Trading conflict for development: utilising 
the trade in minerals from Eastern DR Congo for Development’, Nicholas Garrett & Harrison Mitchell (Resource Consulting Services), April 2009. 
7To answer the question that serves as the title of this report: IPIS has no elements to be able to defend the thesis that 
Belgian traders have knowingly contributed to the financing of the war effort of one or more of the belligerents in 
eastern DRC. During our talks with representatives of the companies discussed in this report, we noticed that they are 
doing everything they can to be open about their activities and to make their Congolese partners operate in a legal 
manner, that is, to force them to comply with all the regulations imposed by the Congolese authorities. At the same 
time, they are aware of the fact that a lot of what is happening on the ground is currently escaping their attention. IPIS 
does not think that Belgian traders should be blamed for their admitted lack of knowledge about what is going on in 
the immediate vicinity of the mines. As the contributors to a recent volume on artisanal diamond mining in the DRC 
have shown, the structures of mining activities at the local level tend to be complicated and difficult to understand 
to uninformed outsiders, because they are the product of decades of social interaction between artisanal diggers, 
miners, supporters and dealers7. Rather than attacking Belgian traders for their ignorance of the intricacies of local 
power struggles, policy-makers at the Congolese national level and on the international level should capitalize on the 
traders’ willingness to contribute to the ongoing process of formalizing the artisanal mining sector in eastern DRC.
Although it is beyond the scope of this report to present an overview of the gold business in the Kivus, it should be 
noted that gold is becoming more and more important and that it is likely to develop into a far more significant source 
of revenues for state and non-state actors than the trade in coltan and cassiterite. Equally noteworthy is the fact that a 
substantial part of the minerals exported by Bukavu-based comptoirs originate from a non-conflict zone in Northern 
Katanga. 
7 ‘Artisanal diamond mining: perspectives and challenges’, Koen Vlassenroot & Steven Van Bockstael (eds.) (2008): p. 267. 
82. Context
2.1. The global tin trade
Cassiterite is one of the ores from which tin is made. Tin has various applications, including solders, stabilizers in PVC, 
coating of other metals to prevent corrosion, and production of circuit boards, dental fillings and fire retardants. As a 
result of new environmental regulations in Japan and Western Europe that obliged manufacturers to use tin instead 
of lead in solders on printed circuit boards, there was a significant price increase in the period before the eruption of 
the global financial crisis. In the first half of 2004, when consumers showed an exaggerated response to the threat of a 
supply shortfall, the world consumption of tin rose by 14%. At a certain point, tin became the best performing metal 
on the London Metal Exchange and, between August 2002 and May 2004, tin prices tripled, reaching a ten-year high of 
US$9.600 per tonne metal in May 20048. In May 2008, prices reached an absolute peak of US$24.052 per tonne metal, 
due to a combination of increased demand worldwide and erratic supply situations in some countries. Remarkably, 
the higher tin prices gave rise to openings and expansions of tin mines and tin smelters in countries such as Australia, 
Bolivia, Canada and Thailand9. From May 2008 onwards, however, a steep decline of the tin price began and early 2009 
decline still has not stopped.
According to the Trading for Peace report, which was published in 2006, the mines of Walikale produced some 10.600 
tonnes of cassiterite and that the estimated cassiterite exports from the DRC amounted to some 16.870 tonnes10. The 
US Geological Service is more conservative and wrote that in 2008 the Democratic Republic of Congo produced 3.000t 
of tin. In that same year, the USGS ranking of the world’s major tin producers looked as follows:
China 150.000t
Indonesia 100.000t
Peru 38.000t
Bolivia 16.000t
Brazil 12.000t
Vietnam 3.500t
2.2 The global tantalum trade
From coltan ore, two precious metals can be extracted: on the one hand, tantalum, and, on the other hand, colombium 
or niobium. Tantalum is used for the production of capacitors that are required for electronic goods such as personal 
computers and mobile phones11. Niobium is used in heat-resistant steel as well as in glass alloys in the construction 
industry. In spite of the fact that Australia is currently considered as the largest coltan producer in the world, it is impor-
tant to bear in mind that 80% of the world’s coltan reserves probably are situated in Africa, and, significantly, 80% of 
these reserves are thought to be found in the DRC. Due to the growth in the electronics sector after 2000, global con-
sumption of coltan soared within a few months time12. 
At the time of writing, it is expected that the global financial crisis and the ensuing economic slowdown will result in 
reduced tantalum material consumption, price and production13. Nevertheless, some observers believe that the crisis 
may boost the demand for coltan from Congo. According to the Australian company Talison, which, on 26 November 
2008, announced its decision to suspend tantalum production at the Wodgina mine, it is likely that the trend to reduce 
material costs in the electronic supply chain will encourage demand for tantalite from Central Africa, where it ‘is avail-
able at relatively low prices because it is often mined illegally or without regard and commitment to health, safety, environ-
ment and labour conditions and frequently transported in contravention of international regulations.14’ 
8 ‘Under-mining peace. Tin: the explosive trade in cassiterite in eastern DRC’, Global Witness, June 2005: 14. 
9 US Geological Survey, mineral commodity summaries (tin): 173
10 ‘Trading for Peace’, Department for International Development, London October 2007: 17.
11 ‘Under-mining peace. Tin: the explosive trade in cassiterite in eastern DRC’, Global Witness, June 2005: 13.
12 ‘Supporting the war economy in eastern DRC: European companies and the coltan trade’, IPIS January 2002: 8. 
13 USGS Mineral Commodity Summary (tantalum) 2009: 165. 
14 ‘Talison to suspend Wodgina tantalum operations’, Talison Media Release, 26 November 2008. One of the companies that has shown an interest in 
the coltan reserves in eastern DRC is the Canadian junior Shamika Resources (see: www.shamikaresources.com/minerals.cfm). 
9The US Geological Survey reported that the ranking of the world’s major tantalum producers looked as follows in the 
year 2008:
Australia 435t
Brazil 180t
Ethiopia 77t
Canada 45t
Rwanda 42t
Other1 36t
1 This category includes Burundi, DR Congo, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
2.3 The mineral trade in the Kivu region
Most of the coltan and cassiterite originating from the hinterlands of North and South Kivu, North Katanga15 and 
Maniema transits through Goma and Bukavu before being exported to destinations outside the DRC. While the most 
important coltan mines are situated in the territoires of Kalehe, Mwenga, Shabunda and Masisi, the most important 
cassiterite mine can be found in the territoire of Walikale16. 
The Kivu provinces have several border crossings with Uganda (Kasindi, Ishasha, Bunagana), Rwanda (Goma-Grande 
Barrière, Bukavu-Cyangugu) and Burundi (Uvira). It is a well-known fact that, ever since the Mobutu era, the Congo-
lese state has lost large amounts of revenue from fraudulent export of primary commodities such as minerals17. This 
can be explained by a wide variety of factors, including the lack of tax harmonization among the different countries 
in the Great Lakes region18, the corrupt behaviour of public servants overseeing the local mineral trade19, the growth 
and expansion of transborder trading networks during the war20 and the ease with which goods such as gold can be 
secretly transported by individual carriers21. 
As far as the official exports of minerals from the Kivu region are concerned, Goma constituted the most important exit 
point for cassiterite and wolframite in 2008, whereas Bukavu was the most important exit point for coltan. 
Exports from Goma, from January to September 2008 (in tons) (Source: Division des Mines)
Cassiterite Coltan Wolframite
10.902,71 31,445 324,42
Exports from Bukavu for the year 2008 (in tons) (Source: Fédération des Entreprises du Congo, South Kivu)
Cassiterite Coltan Wolframite
5.663,32 421,73 167,6
2.4 The security situation in the Kivu region
The situation in the Kivu region never really calmed down after the recent wars in Congo (1996-1997 and 1998-2003). 
It deteriorated again in the run-up to the national and provincial elections in 2006. With the political balance shifting 
away from the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD-Goma), the former rebel movement propped up by 
Rwanda, members of the once marginalized Nande, Hunde and Nyanga groups started supporting Kabila and com-
peting for positions and economic privileges. For their part, members of the Tutsi community, who had supported the 
RCD during the war, started sympathizing with Laurent Nkunda, who had been fighting in the military wing of the 
RCD and in whom they saw an ally in their struggle to protect their economic assets and to prevent their enemies from 
15 One of the companies that is doing business in North Katanga is Kivu Resources, which was created in January 2007. It owns Mining and Proces-
sing Congo (MPC) in the DRC, Metal & Processing Association (MPA) in Rwanda and Central African Resources (CAR) which had an option to acquire 
80% of the Congolese mining parastatal Sakima. Sakima/CAR holds mining permits in Maniema, North and South Kivu. MPC holds exploration 
permits in Kivu and in the region between Manono and Mitwaba in Katanga (see: www.kivuresources.com). 
16 See the interactive IPIS maps at www.ipisresearch.be/maps/Oost-Congo/web/index.html. 
17 ‘The real economy of Zaire: the contribution of smuggling & other unofficial activities to national wealth’, Janet MacGaffey (1991): 17-18. 
18 Sources in the Congolese mineral business told IPIS that, instead of using an export tax system, Rwanda charges an annual tax of 10% on company 
profits. Consequently, people in the DRC do not feel encouraged to export their goods in an official manner (they prefer to smuggle them to Rwanda). 
19 See ‘Rules for sale. Formal and informal cross-border trade in Eastern DRC’, Pole Institute, May 2007. In this report, it is estimated that the accumulated 
taxes and levies along the road from Walikale to Goma amount to 10 to 15% of the export value of the minerals. 
20 See ‘The power of protection: governance and transborder trade on the Congo-Ugandan frontier’, Timothy Raeymaekers 2007, unpublished PhD 
Thesis, University of Ghent. 
21 According to a report on the economy in eastern DRC commissioned by DFID, USAID and COMESA, ‘a very significant proportion – at least 50 %- of 
exports from the DRC is not recorded by government officials in the way they should be – partly because traders and officials under-declare exports in order 
to avoid paying taxes and charges, partly because of bureaucratic weaknesses and poor governance among government organizations’ (source: ‘Trading for 
peace: achieving security and poverty reduction through trade in natural resources in the Great Lakes region’, Hilary Sunman & Nick Bates, October 2007: 4). 
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taking revenge on them for the atrocities committed by the RCD and its allies during the war22. 
During the election period, the renegade general Nkunda showed political ambitions and presented himself as the 
political protector of all minorities in the region, although, in reality, his Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple 
(CNDP) only defended the interests of the Tutsi community. Nkunda said his troops would only integrate into the 
national army on the express condition that the FDLR rebels, a politico-military movement composed of former sol-
diers of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (ex-FAR), ex-Interahamwe militiamen and Hutu civilians who fled their country 
in the wake of the invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front in 199423, would be eradicated. Another conditio 
sine qua non for the military integration was that the 45.000 Congolese Tutsi living in refugee camps in Rwanda had to 
be able to return to the Kivus and retake their lands. Nkunda suspected all non-Tutsi of being associated with the FDLR 
rebels, whom he accused of preparing another genocide against the Tutsi24. 
On 24 November 2006, three days before the announcement of Kabila’s election victory, a Tutsi businessman close 
to Nkunda was shot dead at a checkpoint near Sake, a small town some 30 km from Goma. Nkunda took revenge by 
seizing Sake, a move that convinced MONUC to use attack helicopters and infantry against Nkunda’s troops. The Sake 
incident gave rise to a series of violent confrontations between the FARDC and Nkunda’s army, while it also forced over 
100.000 people to flee between November 2006 and January 200725. 
On 31 December 2006 and 4 January 2007, secret talks were held between Laurent Nkunda and John Numbi, Kabila’s 
air force chief-of-staff, about Nkunda’s amnesty and the modalities of integrating Nkunda’s troops into the Congolese 
national army. After the two parties had concluded a ceasefire agreement, Nkunda gave his go-ahead for the integra-
tion of the 81st and 83rd brigades into the FARDC’s 110th, 106th and 1st North Kivu reserve brigades26. 
However, the agreement between Nkunda and the Kinshasa government was not well received by several groups of 
actors: first by local communities in the Kivus, who had fallen victim to atrocities committed by Nkunda’s troops in the 
past; then by members of the Bashi business and civil society lobby from South Kivu, who were displeased at the pref-
erential treatment given to Tutsi soldiers, by Goma-based Tutsi businessmen, who accused Nkunda of only taking care 
of his personal interests, and, finally, by ordinary citizens in the rest of the DRC, who did not understand why a well-
known ally of Rwanda was given the opportunity to strengthen his position in North Kivu27, to bring more Rwandan 
soldiers into the country and to move the Kivus back into Kigali’s sphere of influence28. 
The factor that eventually led to the collapse of the mixage process was the use of excessive violence by the aforemen-
tioned mixed brigades during attacks on villages controlled by the FDLR between mid-April and mid-May 2007. In a 
reaction against these abuses, the Patriotes Résistants du Congo (PARECO), a newly created anti-Tutsi militia composed 
of a Hutu faction and several Mai Mai groups, teamed up with the FDLR to fight against Nkunda’s troops, who, on 
their turn, retaliated by burning several villages around Ngungu and Katoyi and forcing tens of thousands civilians to 
run for their lives. Things went from bad to worse after Nkunda used a national television interview on 5 May 2007 to 
announce the end of the mixage process, denouncing the lack of logistical support during the operations against the 
FDLR as well as Kinshasa’s refusal to legalize the CNDP, withdraw the arrest warrant against him and negotiate on the 
return of refugees from Rwanda29.  
In spite of the conclusion of the Nairobi and Goma agreements of November 2007 and January 2008 and the estab-
lishment of the so-called Amani programme, intended to create the right conditions for the restoration of peace and 
security and for the reconstruction of the provinces of North and South Kivu30, there was renewed tension in North 
Kivu from the middle of 2008 onwards31. In September and October 2008, Nkunda’s CNDP went into the offensive 
against the FARDC and the militias supported by the latter, such as the FDLR32. The CNDP started marching on Goma in 
late October, but instead of attacking the city, it declared a ceasefire and asked the Congolese government to engage 
in political negotiations. In spite of attempts by the UN and other external parties to reach a negotiated solution for the 
problem, the talks arrived at an impasse by mid-December33. 
In January 2009, a dramatic change occurred in the security situation in North Kivu. On January 20 the Rwandan army 
deployed into Congo’s territory but, this time, together with the FARDC, the Congolese army. The two countries agreed 
to launch this joint military operation, called Umoja Wetu, in early December 2008. Preparations were kept secret. Top 
22 ‘Congo: bringing the peace to North Kivu’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report nr. 133, 31 October 2007: 1; 7. 
23 ‘Mapping conflict motives: eastern DRC’, Steven Spittaels & Filip Hilgert, International Peace Information Service, 4 March 2008: 8. 
24 ‘Congo: bringing the peace to North Kivu’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report nr. 133, 31 October 2007: 7. 
25 Ibidem: 8. 
26 Ibidem: 8-9. 
27 ‘Trouble in Eastern DRC: the Nkunda factor’, Stephanie Wolters, Situation Report, Institute for Security Studies, 3 September 2007. 
28 ‘Congo: bringing the peace to North Kivu’, International Crisis Group, Africa Report nr. 133, 31 October 2007: 9. 
29 Ibidem: 11. 
30 ‘Kabila répond à Nkunda’, La Prospérité, 19 September 2008; ‘Création par le chef d’état d’un programme Amani de sécurisation, pacification, stabilisa-
tion et reconstruction du Kivu’, ACP, 4 February 2008. 
31 ‘Assessing security sector reform and its impact on the Kivu provinces’, ISS situation report, 26 November 2008, Hans Hoebeke & Henri Boshoff & Koen 
Vlassenroot: 7. 
32 ‘Guerre au Nord-Kivu: Laurent Nkunda attaque de nouveau les FARDC près de Manono’, Le Potentiel, 6 September 2008. 
33 ‘Congo’s dangerous crossroads’, Enough Project, 30 January 2009. 
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politicians in Kinshasa were not informed and the UN-force MONUC was barred from taking part in the operation. The 
claimed purpose was to eliminate the Rwandan Hutu rebel force FDLR in North Kivu. But Umoja Wetu announced its 
first victory after only two days when, on 22 January, renegade general Laurent Nkunda was arrested, shortly after 
he had crossed the border with Rwanda. This arrest was part of a deal between the presidents Kabila of Congo and 
Kagame of Rwanda: while Rwanda promised to help Congo with the elimination of the CNDP leader, Congo pledged 
to assist Rwanda in ousting the FDLR from North Kivu34. Following many weeks of fighting, the Rwandan troops with-
drew from Congolese territory at the end of February. Despite the fact that thousands of FDLR rebels continued to 
roam around in the area, Rwanda’s Foreign Minister said that the majority of the FDLR combatants had been dislodged 
from North Kivu35. 
On 23 March 2009, the Congolese government signed a peace deal with the CNDP, an agreement that was supposed 
to lead to the latter’s transformation into a political party. The accord further stipulated that former CNDP soldiers 
would be integrated into the Congolese national army or in a new police force36. 
It must be noted that the international community closely followed the evolutions in the Kivus. Following contacts 
between a delegation from the Kivu civil society and Obama’s campaigning team in August 2008, the newly elected 
American president  encouraged Congo and Rwanda to reach an understanding and to end the instability in Eastern 
Congo37. Furthermore, the former US Assistant Secretary Herman Cohen and the French president Sarkozy both pro-
posed to solve the issue of resource exploitation in eastern DRC by creating an economic common market encompass-
ing Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, a proposal that was almost unanimously rejected by the 
Congolese media because it was believed to create the risk of confirming the dominance of Rwanda-backed economic 
operators in the Kivus38.
34 ‘Civilians at risk from further fighting after Nkunda’s arrest’, IRIN, 26 January 2009. 
35 ‘War against rebels not over despite troop withdrawal’, IRIN, 2 March 2009. 
36 ‘DRC: Kivus move closer to peace, but risks remain’, IRIN, 26 March 2009. 
37 ‘Congo-Rwanda: le premier succès diplomatique de Barack Obama’, Colette Braeckman, 6 March 2009, http://blogs.lesoir.be/colette-braeckman 
38 ‘Can Africa trade its way to peace?’, Herman J. Cohen, Op-Ed New York Times, December 16 2008; ‘Herman Cohen piège Obama et la RDC’, Le 
Potentiel, December 29 2008; ‘Présentation des voeux du Corps Diplomatique. Discours du président Nicolas Sarkozy’, 16 January 2009; ‘Sarkozy veut 
dépécer la RDC’, Le Potentiel, 20 January 2009.
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3. Case studies on Belgian mineral traders
Judging by statistics from the Division Provinciale des Mines (Provincial Mining Division) in Goma, Belgian companies 
were the biggest buyers of cassiterite and wolframite during the first three quarters of 2008. Moreover, they also 
ranked second in the list of foreign coltan buyers, leaving the first position to companies from Hong Kong39. 
Q1-3 20082 rank % 2007 rank %
Cassiterite
Belgium 5,985.47 1 54.93 7,660.6 1 75.3
Rwanda 972 2 8.9 1,068.8 2 10.5
India 856 3 7.9 82 7 0.80
Hong Kong 833.9 4 7.6 186.9 6 1.83
Thailand 769.9 5 7 189.9 5 1.87
Russia 700.59 6 6.4 22.9 11 0.22
Canada 463.79 7 4.2
Austria 144 8 1.3 68 8 0.67
Malaysia 132.06 9 1.2 308.4 4 3.03
United Kingdom 45 10 0.4 520.5 3 5.1
China 40 9 0.39
Holland 24.2 10 0.24
Wolframite
Belgium 258.42 1 79.7 418.2 1 58.2
Hong Kong 66 2 20.3 89.3 3 12.42
Holland 95.5 2 13.28
Austria 74.7 4 10.4
UAE 21 5 2.92
Russia 20 6 2.78
Coltan
Hong Kong 18.41 1 58.6 60.8 1 81.9
Belgium 13.035 2 41.4
S. Africa 13.4 2 18.1
2 Source: Statistiques des exportations à partir de Goma en 2007 par comptoir ou société et pays de destination avec adresse des acheteurs. 
Province du Nord-Kivu. Division Provinciale des Mines et Géologie, Goma. Idem du 1er janvier au 30 septembre 2008.  
3 According to our calculations, total cassiterite exports add up to 11.503,71 tonnes from Q1 until the end of Q3 2008, of which the Belgian buyers 
took 6586,47 tonnes or 57,25%.
Two Belgian traders are dominant in Goma and Bukavu. These are Traxys Belgium and Trademet. They are or were 
partly supplied by two other Belgian traders: Traxys by SDE and Trademet by STI.
3.1 Traxys S.A.
Traxys is the first company on which IPIS has gathered information in the context of this research project40. According 
to the information presented on its website, Traxys was created in 2003, following the merger of Sogem and Considar. 
While Sogem was previously owned by Umicore, serving as a marketing, distribution and trading group involved in 
base metals and concentrates and focusing on Europe, Africa and Asia, Considar used to be a division of Arcelor, serv-
ing the steel industry through the sourcing of ferro-alloys and other specialty metals and focusing primarily on the 
North American market. In 2006, two private equity firms, Pegasus Capital Advisors and Kelso & Company, sponsored 
a buy-out whereby both Arcelor and Umicore sold a majority stake in Traxys to the management of Traxys. After this 
operation, the names of Sogem and Considar were formally replaced with that of Traxys41.
Traxys’ main activities in cassiterite and tantalite in the DRC are situated in Goma and Bukavu. The following table, 
39 Although we do not have similar statistics for the years before 2008, the Division Provinciale des Mines told us that, in 2006 and 2007, Belgian compa-
nies were also the first exporters of cassiterite and wolframite. Nevertheless, in 2007, there was a diversification of the foreign buyers in North Kivu. 
40 Traxys Belgium is a Société Anonyme with the Belgian registration BE 0479.799.315.
41 Source: http://www.traxys.com/Gui/Content.aspx?Page=OurHistory
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which is based on data from the Division des Mines, gives an overview of the available data on Traxys’ mineral purchases 
in the two provincial capitals in the past two years:
Goma 2007
Comptoirs Substance Exported quantity (tonnes)
WMC Cassiterite 162.5
Metachem Cassiterite
Scoria
(split with Trademet and a company from Thailand)
286.7
10 (none to Traxys)
Hua Ying
Cassiterite
(split with Trademet)
89.3
Gemico Cassiterite 40
JMT Cassiterite
Scoria
(split with companies from China, India & Thailand)
343 (255 to Traxys)
97 (none to Traxys)
Goma 2008
Comptoirs Substance Exported quantity (tonnes)
Hua Ying Cassiterite 1,148.9
Gemico Cassiterite 39.8
Kivu Metal Coltan 5.035
WMC Cassiterite 162
Bukavu 2007
Comptoir Substance Exported quantity (tonnes)
WMC Cassiterite 1,131.3
Groupe Olive Cassiterite 270
MDM Cassiterite 232.2
Gemico Sprl was created by Aaron Shabani Asumani and Donald R. Bernard in January 2006. While Asumani is a busi-
nessman from the Maniema province who was among the founders of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s Mouvement de Libération 
du Congo42, Bernard is a retired commander of the US Navy Submarine Service, a professor of international law and an 
attorney. He combines the chairmanship of Gémico with the chairmanship of the American company Glacial Energy 
LLC, while living and working both in Montana and the DRC43.  
In 2006, Gemico signed leasing contracts with the Congolese mining parastatal Société Aurifère du Kivu Maniema 
(SAKIMA) to develop 6 mining concessions in exchange for a monthly rent of US$7.500 for each concession44, though it 
was not very clear what status SAKIMA had at that moment45. In the Maniema province, near the town of Punia, these 
agreements gave rise to a conflict with local artisanal miners, who were forbidden to mine and to trade cassiterite by 
the local authorities. According to the miners, the authorities took the decision at the instigation of Gemico46. In order 
to calm things down, Gemico announced investments worth US$ 2,5 million in the fields of agriculture, road construc-
tion and healthcare in May 200747. 
During a telephone interview with IPIS, Asumani said that his involvement in the MLC had been very limited, as he 
had already left the movement two months after joining it. With regard to his collaboration with the American busi-
nessman Bernard, he explained that the two of them had met in the US a long time ago and that they had developed 
a strong business relationship ever since. According to his own account, Asumani was the one who convinced Ber-
nard to become active in the mineral business in Eastern DRC. As far as Gemico’s dispute with the artisanal miners 
42 ‘Tin: Local inhabitants shun Gemico’, Africa Mining Intelligence nr. 157, 6 June 2007. 
43 Information from the Gemico website (www.gemico.cd) and from a website on which a book co-authored by Bernard is being advertised (http://
www.trafford.com/07-3098). 
44 ‘Rapport de la commission de revisitation des contrats miniers de la RDC’, Vol. 1, YEAR: 171. 
45 According to consultant Nicholas Garrett, the company was wound up in 2002. ‘Walikale. Artisanal cassiterite mining and trade’, Nicholas Garrett, 
CASM, 30 April 2008: 14.
46 ‘Tin: Local inhabitants shun Gemico’, Africa Mining Intelligence nr. 157, 6 June 2007. 
47 Ibidem
14
in Maniema is concerned, Asumani stated that the latter had been working in the SAKIMA concession illegally. He 
maintained that Gemico’s efforts to remove them from the concession in a peaceful manner had been complicated 
by what he described as the rabble-rousing of comptoirs run by Rwandan and Ugandan businessmen. Apparently, 
these businessmen had stirred up the diggers against Gemico, because they did not like the idea that they would no 
longer be able to buy minerals coming from that particular concession. Notwithstanding the dispute with the diggers, 
Gemico still decided to offer some of them a permanent contract. Unfortunately, due to the global financial and eco-
nomic crisis, the company was recently forced to send 500 of its 1000 employees on technical unemployment.  Still, it 
hopes to be able to take them back on board once the economic climate starts to improve. Asumani was glad that his 
company operated in a non-conflict zone in Maniema and he was satisfied with the security work carried out by the 
FARDC and the Congolese national police force48. 
MDM is the second comptoir Traxys has collaborated with. MDM is an acronym for Mudekereza-Defays-Minerais. The 
company is run by the Congolese entrepreneur Namegabe Mudekereza and the Belgian businessman Michel Defays. 
In addition to being active in the mineral business, Mudekereza also exports agricultural products and manages a 
number of quinine plantations in the regions of Kalehe, Walungu and Kabare49. 
In a previous report50, IPIS already described MDM’s business activities during the Congo war. It should be noted that, 
despite the difficult conditions in which it has been forced to operate in the past few years, the company has made real 
efforts to conduct its business in a legal manner: it has been officially registered and has consistently paid its taxes to 
the government services supervising the mining sector, even during the troubled times of the RCD-Goma rebellion. 
Moreover, it has shown a remarkable willingness to discuss its activities with members of the IPIS team. 
Having been accused of buying minerals from FDLR-controlled mines51 in the latest UN report, Namegabe Mudekereza 
wrote a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on 24 December 2008, signing in his capacity as the presi-
dent of the provincial council of the Fédération des Entreprises du Congo (FEC) in South Kivu (see annex). In the letter, he 
stated that the members of the FEC division under his direction had already held several meetings to discuss the issue 
of artisanal mining. According to Mudekereza, they had tried to increase the transparency concerning the origin of the 
minerals, as requested by Dinesh Mahtani, a member of the UN Group of Experts, during a meeting on 31 July 2008. 
Given these efforts, he found it hard to understand why the Bukavu-based comptoirs were still being criticized in the 
UN report. Furthermore, he suggested that the FDLR’s control of the mining business was grossly overstated in the UN 
report. In order to show that he was still prepared to make a positive contribution to the debate about the resource 
problem in eastern DRC, he finished his letter with an enumeration of a number of proposals, put forward by members 
of the FEC division in South Kivu52. 
The World Mining Company (WMC), the third comptoir that used to supply cassiterite to Traxys, has been accused in 
the latest UN report of pre-financing négociants who are working together with the FDLR53. The company is managed 
by Edouard Kitambala54 and is one of the main buyers of cassiterite in the town of Numbi, situated in the territoire 
Kalehe in South Kivu. What makes the latter acquisitions problematic, according to the UN Panel of Experts, is the fact 
that most of the minerals coming into Numbi originate from FDLR- and PARECO-controlled mines in the area55. In addi-
tion to buying cassiterite in the controversial town of Numbi, WMC is also purchasing cassiterite in the town of Lemera, 
where FDLR soldiers operating in the Itombwe region are allegedly selling their cassiterite, gold and coltan56.
Strangely enough, in December 2008, in the same month that the Group of Experts of the UN accused his company of 
buying minerals originating from FDLR-controlled mines57, Edouard Kitambala was paid an amount of $42.000 for real 
estate services by MONUC. On the website of the UN procurement division, which gives an overview of the purchase 
order awards for field missions in 2008, the payment to Kitambala is listed under the reference number 9KIN-200133. 
Without elaborating on the details of the contract, Kitambala confirmed that he had concluded an agreement with 
MONUC for the letting of a building. He preferred not to comment on the UN report published in December 2008 and 
told IPIS that everything he had to say on the matter was discussed in the letter by Namegabe Mudekereza, the presi-
dent of the FEC division of South Kivu (cfr. supra). 
48 Telephone interview with Asumani, 5 May 2009. 
49 ‘Supporting the war economy in the DRC: European companies and the coltan trade’, Jeroen Cuvelier & Tim Raeymaekers (2002): 13. 
50 See footnote 53. 
51 S/2008/773: §84; §85. 
52 Letter from Namegabe Mudekereza to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 24 December 2008.
53 S/2008/773: §78. 
54 S/2008/773: §80. 
55 S/2008/773: §81. 
56 S/2008/773: §85. 
57 See S/2008/773: 79; 82; 85; 86. 
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3.2 Société pour le Développement et l’Expansion d’Entreprises (SDE)
The second company of which we examined the activities, is the Société pour le Développement et l’Expansion 
d’Entreprises (SDE). IPIS was told by SDE’s manager, Mr. Edwin Raes, that SDE delivers all the cassiterite it buys in Goma 
to Traxys.  SDE is part of the Elwyn Blattner Group Int. (GBE), a conglomerate of 20 companies in the DRC. Its administra-
tors are James and Elwyn Blattner58, two American-Italian businessmen with addresses in Kinshasa59. Apart from serv-
ing as a Brussels-based logistic centre that supplies the other GBE-companies with spare parts, chemicals and other 
necessities, SDE also markets the minerals from the Goma-based comptoir Sodexmines, which has Lebanese manage-
ment60. The close collaboration between SDE and Sodexmines can be explained by the fact that GBE – to which SDE 
belongs – has a 50% stake in Sodexmines 61. 
With regard to the subject of this paper, it is interesting to note that Sodexmines, which buys minerals in North Kivu 
and Maniema and has its own concessions in Katanga (Malemba Nkulu), is the most important cassiterite comptoir in 
Goma. While, in 2007, it bought 2.974 tons of cassiterite, in 2008, it purchased 2.731 tons of the same mineral. 
When asked for a reaction to Traxys’ decision to put a stop to its activities in Eastern DRC, Raes said that it would be dif-
ficult for him and his Congolese partners to continue on their own. He was worried that, due to the global financial and 
economic crisis, Sodexmines would have a hard time finding new buyers for its minerals. On a more general note, he 
regretted that the withdrawal of companies such as Traxys was likely to have a negative effect on the ongoing efforts 
of the Congolese authorities and the international community to make the mineral business more transparent. In his 
view, some of the Chinese and South African companies that were about to become active on the local mineral market 
were far less concerned about human rights and transparency issues than companies such as Traxys and SDE. Finally, 
Raes informed IPIS that his company had obtained a licence for the exploration of a concession in Northern Katanga, 
with the idea of selling Katangese cassiterite in the near future62.
3.3 Trademet S.A.
Trademet, the third Belgian company examined by IPIS, was established in 1989, has its registered address in Grez-
Doiceau (about 30 kilometres from Brussels) and employs only two people63. Since 1991, the company has been a 
member of the Minor Metals Trade Association (MMTA), an organization founded in 1973 and claiming to be the world’s 
largest association concerned with minor metals64. According to the information on the MMTA website, Trademet 
mainly trades in tantalite and cassiterite, though it also deals in noble alloys and minor metals. From a geographical 
point of view, the company operates worldwide, but it has specific interests in Africa, the Far East and Europe65. 
Freddy Muylaert, the founder of Trademet, told IPIS that he first cooperated with the Braine L’Alleud-based mineral 
trader Sudamin before he moved on to develop his own business, which started its activities in Burundi. During the 
early years of its existence, Trademet chiefly occupied itself with the wholesale trade in non-ferrous scrap as well as 
with the distribution of non-ferrous metals in Europe, including lead, calcium, antimony, arsenic, selenium, bismuth, 
tellurium and alloys66. In the DRC, Trademet’s initial focus was on coltan. It was not until 7 or 8 years ago that it switched 
its attention to cassiterite. Most of Trademet’s minerals are shipped to customers in Malaysia, Thailand and China. Muy-
laert’s British correspondent is Michael Winterton, with whom he has a long-standing working relationship67. 
The following table gives an overview of the comptoirs Trademet has been collaborating with in 2007 and in the first 
three quarters of 200868:
58 According to FinnWatch, the Blattner’s other Congo-based businesses include construction, road building, telecommunications, aviation, truc-
king, port services and agriculture. They have been operating in Congo for the past 46 years and appear to have bought some of their best assets 
after the Mobutu regime seized them from their Belgian owners in the beginning of the 1970s (‘Connecting components, dividing communities: tin 
production for consumer electronics in the DR Congo and Indonesia’, FinnWatch, December 2007: 37-38). 
59 Elwyn Blattner is the son of James Blattner. Source: SDE Annual Report 2007. SDE’s registration number as a Belgian ‘société anonyme’ is BE 
0407.142.949. It has a capital of €247.894. 
60 Sodexmines is directed by mr. Basem El Ali. According to FinnWatch, he is a Lebanese businessman with a British passport. He is said to have 
entered the North Kivu mineral market from Kinshasa in 2005 (source: ‘Connecting components, dividing communities: tin production for consumer 
electronics in the DR Congo and Indonesia’, FinnWatch, December 2007: 36). 
61 Interview with Edwin Raes (SDE) in Brussels, 7 January 2009, and with Basem El Ali (Sodexmines) in Goma, 24 April 2009.. 
62 Telephone interview with Edwin Raes, 5 May 2009. 
63 Trademet’s Belgian registration is BE 0433.369.076.
64 Information from the MMTA website: www.mmta.co.uk/about/history
65 Information from the MMTA webiste: www.mmta.co.uk/members/memberDetails
66 Up until today, Trademet’s trade in non-ferrous metal continues (personal communication with Freddy Muylaert, 7 April 2009). 
67 Interview with Freddy Muylaert in Grez-Doiceau, 14 November 2008
68 As we have already pointed out earlier in this report, STI bought 25 tons of cassiterite from the Hill Side comptoir in 2007. Since this cargo was sub-
sequently delivered to Trademet, it should be considered as part of Trademet’s cassiterite purchases for that year.  (Interview with Freddy Muylaert 
in Grez-Doiceau, 14 November 2008).   
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2007 
Comptoirs Type of mineral Exported quantity (tonnes)
Amur
Cassiterite
Wolframite
Scoria
2,500.5
418.2
20
Munsad
Cassiterite
Scoria
315
25
Clepad Cassiterite 539.1
Avisam Trading Cassiterite 278.5
La Comète Cassiterite 48.3
2008 (Quarters 1-2-3)
Amur
Cassiterite
Wolframite
1,774.2
219.12
Clepad Cassiterite 932.1
MIM Cassiterite 64.47
Munsad
Cassiterite
Coltan
212
8
Hill Side
Cassiterite
Wolframite
110.9
15.3
The first Congolese comptoir selling minerals to Trademet is Munsad. While, on 19 May 1999, it was registered in the 
trade register of the tribunal de grande instance in Goma, on 18 December 2004, it was enrolled at the national level69. 
Damien Munyarugerero, the businessman in charge of Munsad, was involved in various economic activities before 
entering the mineral business. Apart from selling fresh meat along the Masisi-Goma-Kinshasa axis and being involved 
in air transport through the company Kivu Air Transport sprl, he traded in petrol products, lubricants and second-hand 
clothing through the company Azimut sprl 70.
In 2008, Munsad in Goma exported 3 shipments of coltan (totalling 13 tons) and 234 tons of cassiterite. According to 
the Munsad management, the cassiterite came from Kindu, Punia and Kalima in the Maniema Province, from Manono 
in Katanga and to a lesser extent from Walikale. It was supplied from Maniema by two (groups of ) négociants: ‘Les 
Katentula’ for Maniema and Mbusa-Makalikali for Manono and Walikale. For each of them, Munsad pays US$500 a 
year for a middleman card (carte de négociant). The coltan originates from Bibatama in Masisi, where Munsad buys 
its coltan from Muneza Nkundiye and Karemera Kabatsi. Once again, Munsad paid for their Cartes de Négociant. The 
coltan export licence was issued on 23 June 2008. 
According to Munyarugerero, Munsad was instrumental in the creation of COOPERAMMA (Coopérative des Exploitants 
Artisanaux Miniers de Masisi), a cooperative society of artisanal miners recognized by the authorities of North Kivu71. 
This cooperative signed an agreement on 3 September 2005 with Bazinga Kabano and Hitimana Gabyura Pierre to 
exploit the Bibatama D3-concession. Munyarugerero says that his négociants Muneza and Karemera are members of 
COOPERAMMA too. He denies having been supplied with minerals by Bayose Senkoke and Mboni Habarugira, two 
people given permission by the CNDP to exploit part of an adjacent concession at Bibatama, according to the UN Panel 
of Experts72. Furthermore, Munyarugerero strongly denies having friendly links with the CNDP or its leader Laurent 
Nkunda. “How”, asked Munyarugerero when meeting with one of the authors of this report, “can I be friends with those 
who have destroyed my milk- and cheese-factory?”. 
One source told IPIS that the information about Munsad’s alleged links with the CNDP in the latest UN report came 
from one of the parties involved in a series of land disputes in Masisi. The first element that contributes to the credibil-
ity of this hypothesis is the fact that the concession exploited by Munsad’s cooperative society COOPERAMMA is adja-
cent to another concession that has been the object of litigation between, on the one hand, Edouard Mwangachuchu, 
69 Munsad’s Register of Commerce number is NRC 2209. Its immatriculation dates from 19 May 1999. On 16 April 2004 Munsad was granted official 
recognition by the Transitional government but the national identification 5-93-N42673R dates from 18 December 2004. Somewhere in between 
1999 and 2004 Munsad received an ‘Agrément’ from the RCD-rebellion. 
70 Interview with Damien Munyarugerero on 22 April 2009 in Goma.
71 N° Agrément N01/053/CAB-GV-NK/08
72 Letter from Damien Munyarugerero to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 21 December 2008. 
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and, on the other hand, Mboni Habarugira and Bayose Senkoko (cfr. supra)73.  
Senator Mwangachuchu74, who was born and raised in Masisi, left North Kivu in 1995, after having fallen victim to anti-
Tutsi violence encouraged by the Mobutu regime. Together with his wife and his six children, he was granted political 
asylum in the US in 1996. Two years later, during a return visit to his home region, he noticed that his cattle farm had 
been destroyed, but that it was still possible to capitalize on the land, which appeared to be rich in coltan. Teaming up 
with Robert Sussman, a former Baltimore-based physician whom he had met in a hotel in Goma in 1998, he started 
trading minerals through his company MHI (Mwangachuchu Hizi International)75. 
In 2001, Mwangachuchu started an argument with Bayose Senkoko over the Mataba Hill, a very small but mineral-rich 
piece of land in Masisi. Three years earlier, on 29 May 1998, Senkoko had bought a plot at Mataba Hill measuring 5 by 
12 metres from Seburo Basharira for $200. On 5 May 2001, Senkoko sold a piece of this land, measuring 6 by 8 metres, 
to Mbonigaba Buhoro. However, around the same time, the mining department of the RCD-Goma rebel movement 
delivered a coltan mining permit to Mwangachuchu, allowing him to exploit an area of 5 square kilometres called Bis-
unzu-Bibatama, which included the Mataba Hill. When Mwangachuchu paid 40.000$ to Basharira to compensate him 
for the loss of Mataba Hill, the latter was taken to court by Senkoko and Buhoro, who accused him of having sold the 
same land twice: first to them and then to Mwangachuchu’s company MHI. As the court ruled in favour of Senkoko and 
Buhoro, Seburo was forced to pay them damages, while Mwangachuchu’s MHI was ordered to stop mining at Mataba 
Hill. Yet, even after the Supreme Court rejected an appeal against this decision launched by Seburo, Mwangachuchu 
continued his mining operations76. 
The second element that makes it plausible that the information about Munsad’s alleged connections to the CNDP 
came from one of the people involved in land disputes in Masisi is that Munyarugerero, just like Mwangachuchu, is 
trying hard to win back land he lost during the eruptions of anti-Tutsi violence in 1995, a pursuit that has made him a 
lot of enemies.
Munyarugerero insists that, before the riots of 1995, his father owned substantial pieces of land in the territory of 
Masisi, which he used for large-scale cattle breeding. He also maintains that his father’s entire stock was destroyed ‘as a 
result of the armed conflicts in the region’77. While IPIS was unable to verify Munyarugerero’s claims about the pre-1995 
period, it did obtain a number of documents about his landownership in the period after 2004.
According to these documents, Munyarugerero bought three concessions in Masisi in 2004 and 2005: Rushengo (+/-
250 hectare) for an amount of 75.000$, Kaniro (+/- 105 hectare) for an amount of 31.500$ and Shungwe (+/-180 hec-
tare) for an amount of 54.000$, which together make up the Ferme Agropastorale de Kabati 78. The person selling the 
three concessions to Munyarugerero was Pierre Pay-Pay wa Syakassighe, a prominent and well-known politician from 
North Kivu79. Pay-Pay’s political career started in the 1980s, when he twice led the department of national economy, 
industry and external trade and once the ‘département de portefeuille’. When Laurent-Désiré Kabila seized power in 
May 1997, he went into exile in Belgium. In April 2003, he was appointed as the high representative of the political 
opposition in the follow-up committee dealing with the Global and Inclusive Agreement on transition in the DRC, and 
in July 2003, he became a member of parliament as a representative of the unarmed political opposition. Having cre-
ated, at the end of 2005, a political platform called Codeco (Coalition des démocrates congolais), he ran as a candidate 
in the presidential elections of 200680. 
In order to understand the animosity about Munyarugerero’s land acquisitions, one has to take into account that 
Masisi has been faced with local struggles for land for a very long time. Due to its location at the fertile highlands of 
North Kivu, the territory is potentially one of the richest and most productive parts of Central Africa. Apart from the 
fact that it offers the possibility of harvesting three times a year, the region also harbours vast water, food and energy 
supplies and it presents the right conditions for cattle ranching. During the years of Mobutu’s patrimonial rule, a new 
class of ‘rural capitalists’ came into existence, which had disastrous consequences for large parts of the rural population 
in Masisi, who lost their parcels. From 1993 onwards, Masisi has witnessed eruptions of ethnic violence as well as an 
73 S/2008/773: §59. 
74 In a report published on 4 March 2008, IPIS pointed out that Mwangachuchu’s stakes in the mining business in Eastern DRC were twofold: on the 
one hand, he was one of the most important operators of the Numbi mine, which constituted a significant source of revenues for various belliger-
ents, and, on the other hand, his company MHI (Mwangachuchu Hizi International) was the only one with an exploitation permit for the D2 site of 
the Mumba/ Bibatama mine, known to harbour deposits of cassiterite, coltan and wolframite and controlled by soldiers of the CNDP (source: ‘Map-
ping conflict motives: Eastern DRC’, Steven Spittaels & Filip Hilgert, 4 March 2008: 25; 33). 
75 ‘The dirt in the new machine’, New York Times, 12 August 2001; Interview with Mwangachuchu, L’Observateur, 21 February 2008. 
76 ‘Digging deeper: how the DR Congo’s mining policy is failing the country’, Dominic Johnson & Aloys Tegera, December 2005: 43-44. 
77 Letter from Damien Munyarugerero to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 21 December 2008.
78 In the deed, which was signed on 5 January 2005, it was stipulated, amongst other things, that the assignor was obliged to evict the peasants set-
tled in the concessions within a period of 6 months, while he was also bound to reimburse the price of whatever part of the concession that would 
turn out to be legally owned by a third party. 
79 On 2 November 1984, he was appointed as the chairman of the company Gécamines commerciale, and, between 12 April 1985 and 30 March 
1991, he served as the governor of the national bank, the Banque du Zaire. As a member of the political party UDI, he became the minister of finance 
in the Kengo-wa-Dongo government between 6 July 1994 and 26 February 1996.
80 ‘Biographies des acteurs de la transition’, Jean Omasombo & Erik Kennes (2006): 218. 
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upsurge of militia activities, leading to massive displacement and the interruption of agricultural activities81.
Finally, it is important to mention that Munyarugerero has business interests in Rwanda as well. Apart from owning 
a buying house for minerals and a refinery in Kigali, he also has a cassiterite mine in the Kayunza district and coltan 
mines in the districts of Gakenke and Muhanga.
Trademet’s second supplier is the Goma-based comptoir Amur, which was created in 2004 and officially registered 
in 200682. Trademet helped Amur to start its activities two or three years ago by selling it second-hand equipment 
originating from Asia.83. Amur’s memorandum of association, which was drawn up on 3 February 2006, mentions the 
names of two founding members: Antoine Rutera Muhindagiga and Amani Bahali. IPIS has been able to establish that 
Muhindagiga hails from the isle of Idjwi in Lake Kivu, where he is said to be involved in the exploitation of one of the 
local mines84. As far as Amani Bahali is concerned, IPIS was told that he is the 12-year old son of a man named Bahali 
Mirindi. Bahali Mirindi is the younger brother of Janvier Kamwanya Bora Uzima, a former officer of the Forces Armées 
Zairoises, the national army under the Mobutu regime (see box). 
BOX: THE EVENTFUL CAREER OF BORA UZIMA
Janvier Kamwanya Bora Uzima, who is a MuHavu  from Idjwi, was born in Bukavu on 15 December 195885. He was 
an officer in Mobutu’s Division Spéciale Présidentielle and was trained in intelligence work. According to a report 
by the Congolese NGO Observatoire Gouvernance-Transparence, published in September 2003, Bora Uzima 
Kamwanya supplied military intelligence to Anselme Masasu Nindaga, the special advisor in charge of security 
issues with Kabila’s rebel movement AFDL. After Kabila’s take-over, Kamwanya was granted the position of major-
commandant. In 1999-2000 he got into trouble because of his supposed links with the RCD-leaders Joseph Mud-
umbi and Bizima Karaha. On January 16 2001, when president Laurent-Désiré Kabila was assassinated, Bora Uzima 
was suspected of having co-masterminded the murder. In an interview with IPIS, he defended himself saying that 
he left Congo in December 2000, asking for asylum in Congo Brazzaville but moving on to Nigeria to do business 
there. On 20 January 2001 however - four days after the assassination -while travelling from Nigeria to Kenya, he 
was arrested on board of a Cameroun Airlines airplane during a stop in Kinshasa, for his alleged involvement in 
the assassination86.  He escaped in the night between 27 and 28 February 2001. Subsequently, he went to Bukavu, 
where he started recruiting troops among former members of Mudundu 40 and Kabila’s kadogos87. Having joined 
the military structure of RCD-Goma, he was put forward as a candidate for the position of commander of one of 
the newly created military regions in August 2003. After he had moved to Kisangani, he got into trouble with the 
RCD-faction led by Azarias Ruberwa,. According to Bora Uzima, the real reason behind this disagreement was that 
Ruberwa’s faction was disturbed by the fact that he was “cleaning up the mess the RCD had left behind in Kisan-
gani”. At the end of August 2003, Bora Uzima launched an armed rebellion in Kisangani, before fleeing to Goma. In 
November 2003, he was accused of being in charge of a rebel camp in Mumosho (close to Bukavu), in cooperation 
with governor Ciribanya88. Bora Uzima denies these accusations and maintains that he received orders from both 
general Nyabolwa and general Mbusa Mabe, when they were commanding the 10th Military Region in Bukavu.
According to his own account, Bora Uzima created a company called FAKAM in 1991 while he was in the army 89. 
FAKAM – an acronym derived from Famille Kamanyula (= the name of Bora Uzima’s grandfather) - owned two cold-
storage rooms in Kinshasa, where it worked together with the Orgaman-group, which is specialized in the food import 
business. In 1993, FAKAM opened the first modern petrol station in Goma. Since the company had a hard time obtain-
ing a licence for the export of minerals from Congolese territory90, Bora Uzima decided to export his minerals – mainly 
cassiterite originating from Walikale – under the licence of Amur, the company co-founded by the eldest son of his 
younger brother (cfr. supra). 
Freddy Muylaert told IPIS that he had met with Bora Uzima and that the latter was clearly not hiding for the Congolese 
81 ‘Household land use strategies in a protracted crisis context: land tenure, conflict and food security in eastern DRC’, Koen Vlassenroot: 1-19. 
82 Interview with Amur, 26 April 2009
83 Interview with Freddy Muylaert in Grez-Doiceau on 14 November 2008. 
84 See: ‘Activités minières dans l’île d’Idjwi et Territoire de Walikale’, a paper written in December 2007 by Edson Niyonsaba Sebigunda, a student from 
the University of Bukavu.  
85 Interview with Bora Uzima in Goma on 21 April 2009. See also: ‘Biographies des acteurs de la transition’, Jean Omasombo & Erik Kennes 2006: 37.  
86 According to Amnesty International, Kamwanya Bora Uzima was arrested on 20 January 2001, aboard an airplane at Kinshasa’s Ndjili airport. The 
plane was on a scheduled stop en route to Nairobi, coming from Lagos. Kamwanya Bora Uzima had left the DRC in hopes that he would be able to 
get political asylum, either in Brazzaville or in Lagos (source: ‘DRC: deadly conspiracies?’, Amnesty International 2001: 6).
87 ‘Le Rwanda plante le décor d’une nouvelle guerre d’agression à l’est de la RDC’, Observatoire Gouvernance-Transparence, September 2003: 28. 
88 ‘Biographies des acteurs de la transition’, Jean Omasombo & Erik Kennes 2006: 37. 
89 FAKAM was created on 5 October 1992 and the statutes deposed with the Journal Officiel on 12 October 1992. Acte de dépot 7 November 1992. Its 
registration number is 67103, its number with the commercial registry is NRC 28806 and its national identification number is K24.881E.
90 Between July and December 2008, the Congolese authorities introduced a temporary limit on the granting of export licences for minerals such as 
coltan, cassiterite and wolframite. 
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authorities, since he regularly travelled to Belgium where he had a permanent residence91. Bora Uzima was demobi-
lized as a Brigade General from the national army in May 2005 and pretends that due to his good relations with the 
national parliament, the senate and the presidency, he managed to make a positive contribution to the restoration of 
peace in eastern DRC92. For his part, Amur’s Muhindagiga refused to answer our questions concerning Bora Uzima93. 
3.4 Services and Trading International (STI)
The last Belgian company investigated by IPIS is Services and Trading International (STI), which supplied minerals from 
Kivu to Trademet. STI is based in the Belgian city of Antwerp (Berchem) and trades in coffee and minerals. According to 
its annual report of 2007, the company has two administrators: on the one hand, Patrick Serruys, who holds the posi-
tion of executive administrator, and, on the other hand, the company Sicaz, which has been assigned the position of 
administrator. 
IPIS has been able to establish that, in 2007, STI bought 25 tons of cassiterite from the small Hill Side comptoir in Goma. 
Apart from that particular transaction, however, there are no indications that STI has made additional acquisitions of 
minerals in the Kivu region. Its name does not feature in the statistics made available to IPIS by the Division des Mines 
in Goma. Furthermore, Mr. Serruys maintains that STI has suspended its minerals buying activities in Goma since 10 
July 2008, due to renewed fighting in North Kivu and to a strike among the comptoirs in North Kivu (cfr. infra)94.
91 Interview with Freddy Muylaert in Grez Doiceau, 14 November 2008. 
92 Personal communication with Freddy Muylaert, 7 April 2009. 
93 Interview with Antoine Rutera Muhindagiga, October 2008. 
94 Interview with Patrick Serruys in Berchem,10 December 2008. 
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4. Conclusions
In a recent report on the artisanal mining sector in the Kivu region, Garrett has rightly observed that the latter is highly 
dynamic “with frequent reconfigurations of actors and power relations”95. In the context of the mineral business in the 
Kivu region, Congolese comptoirs and foreign trading companies are the most visible parts of a complex commodity 
chain. More than once they have been criticized by external observers, because of their links with comptoirs allegedly 
contributing to the financing of armed groups involved in conflicts in eastern DRC. 
The Belgian traders maintain that they do their utmost to make their Congolese partners operate in a legal and trans-
parant manner. These efforts must be applauded. Belgian traders should apply (or introduce) due dilligence and make 
sure that their supply chain works according to responsible social, environmental and human rights standards. Fur-
thermore, they should commit themselves to the international electronics industry’s move towards clean practices 
undertaken by a.o. the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition96. 
Central and provincial governments in Congo have repeatedly tried to re-establish the state’s authority in the mining 
zones, and they continue to do so. It is also their aim to restructure and invigorate the state’s agencies that are moni-
toring the various links of the supply chain, in order to increase state revenue from the mining business and decrease 
fraud. 
Traceability97 has been cited as another solution to put the sector in order. Germany has undertaken experiments with 
regard to the traceability of coltan98. Unfortunately, the method appears to be extremely costly, time consuming and 
therefore not quite operational on the ground. A system to audit the links in the supply chain may demand inten-
sive input of human resources but might in the longer turn be better applicable. To all these efforts the international 
community can make further contributions. The world can only hope that neighbouring countries in the Great Lakes 
region enhance their collaboration within the existing regional bodies. This may lead to a harmonization of tax tariffs 
so as to discourage fraudulent exports and a laundering of contraband minerals abroad. Regional cooperation is also 
one of the main recommendations proposed by the African Union in a report entitled Africa Mining Vision. This impor-
tant document, which is to be followed by other reports and which results from two years of study and discussion, now 
constitutes a major reference work for the transformation of Africa’s mineral wealth into wealth for its people.
95 ‘Walikale. Artisanal cassiterite mining’, Nicholas Garrett, CASM, 30 April 2008: 7.
96 GeSI and EICC statement on mining of metals. February 2009.
97 The identification through laboratory tests of the precise geographical origin (fingerprinting in the jargon) of a particular mineral ore.
98 http://www.e-sga.org/index.php?id=201 (last accessed on 15 March)
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